Through speech acts by Chinese policymakers1 and the publication of defense white papers2, China has long signaled its intentions to ‘reunify’ Taiwan with the Chinese mainland, with the option of using military force if deemed necessary. The United States has a legal obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself but responds with strategic ambiguity regarding whether it would militarily intervene should China invade Taiwan. To counter any potential U.S. involvement China is developing A2/AD capabilities to prevent United States military forces from entering the theater of operations. Using a qualitative research methodology, this short paper will examine how the United States military can counter China’s A2/AD capabilities in a Taiwan contingency scenario. It will achieve this by firstly examining China’s A2/AD capabilities and then secondly by assessing U.S. weapon platforms, tactics, and strategy. The paper will then preliminarily conclude that the United States would be unlikely to inflict a decisive defeat, instead the conflict would involve the gradual erosion of Chinese A2/AD capabilities over a period of time. 

Although no singular definition exists, a NATO Defence College paper defines A2/AD as: ‘The objective of an anti-access or area denial strategy is to prevent the attacker from bringing its forces into the contested region (A2) or to prevent the attacker from freely operating within the region and maximizing its combat power (AD)’3. Modern Chinese military doctrine has seen it change from a historical land warfare capability to one that is now focusing on maritime and airpower. A specific part of this shift in focus has seen China expanding its footprint within the South China Sea and the Strait of Taiwan. China has been developing sea and air A2/AD capability within these geographic areas involving a highly sophisticated, multilayered network of naval forces, air defense, and long-range precision missiles. The main platform and systems within its A2/AD arsenal are large stocks of land-attack and anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-21D and DF-26D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile as well as the hypersonic DF-17 missile. The DF-21D is a missile of particular concern and has been referred to as the ‘carrier killer’. It is a highly accurate, solid fuel, road mobile launched ballistic missile capable of hitting moving sea targets up to around 900 miles (1,500km)4. Meanwhile, the DF-26 has a longer range of up to 2,500 miles (4,000km), making it capable of striking U.S. land targets on Guam with the conventional version of the missile, in addition to its anti-ship D variant that can hit targets at sea as well5. Additionally, the DF-17 is a regular medium-range ballistic missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle, of which China is currently developing an anti-ship variant6. This will give China a hypersonic anti-ship missile capability that will prove extremely challenging for the United States to counter with its existing Aegis radar and air-defense systems from the sea and the Patriot and THAAD systems from land. 

Furthermore, China’s area denial capabilities also include overlapping air-defense platforms designed to combat cruise missiles, aircraft, and drones consisting of domestically produced HQ-9 and Russian made S-400 Surface to Air Missile Systems. Satellite photo reconnaissance has shown that these systems have been placed throughout the artificial island chains that China has been building across the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands7. Although the majority of China’s A2/AD capabilities are fixed land-based platforms, it also includes submarine, surface ships, and airpower capability as well. China is producing a formidable airpower capability with its J-20 fifth generation stealth fighter jet, a near-peer competitor to its Western counterparts, and is on target to have around 1,000 of these indigenously produced stealth fighters by 20308.
This material capability is further reinforced by space, cyber, and electronic warfare systems with a vast C4ISR infrastructure consisting of networks of satellites, reconnaissance drones, maritime surveillance ships as well as the ability to disrupt communications and jamming of GPS signals. The main weakness with this, however, is the vast area that China needs their over the horizon radar and satellite systems to cover. This creates gaps in radar coverage and reduces radar effectiveness the further the system must operate from the mainland. China is negating this weakness and extending the coverage of its radar and ISR infrastructure by placing these systems across the previously mentioned islands chains, however this will lead to their isolation making it easier for the United States to reach, target, and damage or destroy. 

Therefore, the main United States strategy used to destroy or degrade the A2/AD network would be to focus on this entire kill chain system rather than to concentrate on shooting down each individual missile every time one is fired. This involves attacking and damaging or destroying Chinese ISR systems, radar networks, Command & Control infrastructure, and the mobile missile launch platforms themselves. China can have as many sophisticated ‘carrier killer’ missiles as it likes, but if it cannot detect, track, and target U.S. ships because this capability has been damaged or destroyed then it renders its A2/AD capabilities less effective. To achieve all this, it is likely that the United States would require a joint multi-domain operations approach involving the full spectrum of air, naval, land, space, and cyber capabilities. Required weapon platforms would involve the use of stealth aircraft such as the F-35, B-2 Spirit, and B-21 Raider to avoid radar systems and to penetrate defended airspace from the air, as well as Astute class and Virginia class submarines from the sea. All these platforms would use long-range strike munitions such as the Tomahawk cruise missile with a 1,000 mile (1,500km) range9 and the AGM-158 JASSM with a 500 mile (900km) range.10 The benefit of using these types of munitions will be the precision and stand-off range that the weapons provide allowing a high accuracy, lower risk attack option for the personnel deploying them. 

U.S. tactics to implement this strategy could also include saturation and overload methods involving volume of fire, deployment of decoys, multiple simultaneous land, sea, and air attacks, attacks from different directions, and the distribution of forces to negate China’s A2/AD offensive capabilities by dispersing land and maritime units to concentrate them in smaller numbers. In addition, electronic warfare and cyber operations would play a crucial role with radar jamming, communications disruption, and GPS interference. 

Under Kenneth E. Boulding’s loss-of-strength gradient theory however, one disadvantage that the United States will face is that the amount of military strength a nation state can project is weakened the further the distance from its source11. China will be fighting on its doorstep, whereas U.S. forces will be operating thousands of miles from their core centers of strength. However, there is potential for escalation with neighboring states closer to the center of the conflict actively participating in the defense of Taiwan, such as Japan. Despite historically having a self-defense doctrine, in 2015 the Japanese government enacted a new security law allowing its armed forces to use military force in defense of other nation states12. Japan could frame China’s invasion of Taiwan as a threat to its own security and use military force to either defend Taiwan, actively assist U.S. forces in combat, or to cement its position with its own territorial disputes against China and the Senkaku Islands that Japan owns but China stakes a claim to as well. 

Once China decides it will take action and uses military force against Taiwan this could take shape as either a maritime blockade campaign cutting off all import and exports until Taiwan capitulates or a full kinetic war with a ground invasion. Whatever action China does take will most likely be preceded with speech acts by Chinese policymakers securitizing an issue as an excuse to invade Taiwan backed up by a social media campaign spreading misinformation to gain international support. Western military thinking understands that enemy forces cannot be destroyed instantly and that defeating A2/AD networks will gradually occur over time to degrade situational awareness in order to reduce missile and air defense effectiveness. China would still be left with a formidable force of submarines, surface ships, and airpower however, but its ability to contest the theater would be severely diminished. Overall, it will be not so much a case of ‘breaking down the wall’ of China’s A2/AD in one go, but rather dismantling it brick by brick to ensure military success.

 Reuters (2024) ‘China won't renounce use of force over Taiwan; Xi visits frontline island’, Reuters (online), available at https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-it-will-not-renounce-use-force-over-taiwan-2024-10-16/ 
2 CSIS (2019) ‘China’s New 2019 Defense White Paper’, Center for Strategic and International Studies (online), available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-2019-defense-white-paper 
3 Lasconjarias, G and Marrone, A (2016) ‘New Research Division Publication – How to Respond to Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)? Towards a NATO Counter-A2/AD Strategy’, NATO Defense College (online), available at https://www.ndc.nato.int/new-research-division-publication-how-to-respond-to-anti-access-area-denial-a2-ad-towards-a-nato-counter-a2-ad-strategy/ 
4 CSIS (2024) ‘Missiles of the World: China, DF-21’, Missile Threat CSIS Missile Defense Project (online) available at https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/ 
5 CSIS (2024) ‘Missiles of the World: China, DF-26’, Missile Threat CSIS Missile Defense Project (online) available at https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng-26-df-26/ 
6 CSIS (2024) ‘Missiles of the World: China, DF-17’, Missile Threat CSIS Missile Defense Project (online) available at https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-17/ 
7 RAND (2016) ‘Beijing Ups the Ante in South China Sea Dispute with HQ-9 Deployment’, RAND Corporation (online) available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2016/03/beijing-ups-the-ante-in-south-china-sea-dispute-with.html 
8 Bronk, J (2025) ‘The Evolution of Russian and Chinese Air Power Threats’, Royal United Services Institute (online) available at https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/evolution-russian-and-chinese-air-power-threats. 
9 Raytheon (2026) ‘Tomahawk Cruise Missile’, Raytheon (online) available at https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/sea/tomahawk-cruise-missile 
10 Lockheed Martin (2026) ‘JASSM’, Lockheed Martin (online) available at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/jassm.html 
11 Boulding, K.E. (1962) Conflict and Defense: A General Theory’, Harper, New York
12 Yamaguchi, M (2015) ‘Japan enhances military’s role as security bills pass’, Associated Press News (online) available at https://apnews.com/general-news-international-news-bf06b3fa661f47e689f6ccd50599f5d9