The issue of nuclear proliferation remains a cornerstone of contemporary international security policy. A frequently cited criticism within this discourse is the perceived double standard in allowing certain states—such as Israel—to possess nuclear weapons, while vehemently opposing others, particularly Iran, from obtaining them. Critics argue that this undermines the credibility of the global non-proliferation regime. However, this critique often overlooks critical distinctions in strategic culture, political rationality, and the explicit intentions expressed by state actors. This short report by NQM Defence argues that rational actor theory, empirical threat perception, and the strategic implications of theological governance in Tehran explain why Israel is correct to have nuclear weapons, but not Iran. 

One of the most fundamental differences between Israel and Iran in the nuclear debate lies in strategic signalling—particularly, the threat or lack thereof regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Israel maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity regarding its nuclear arsenal, widely believed to have existed since the 1960s, but has never explicitly threatened another state with nuclear force. Its nuclear strategy is based on deterrence, underpinned by survivability and second-strike capability.

Conversely, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently used inflammatory rhetoric, particularly against Israel. Statements by senior Iranian officials—including the infamous phrase often translated as a desire to “wipe Israel off the map”—represent not just ideological hostility, but raise legitimate concerns about Tehran’s intentions should it acquire a nuclear deterrent. While interpretations of such rhetoric vary, the core concern lies in the fact that Iran's language violates established norms of nuclear restraint, which emphasise de-escalatory signalling, even in cases of hostile rivalry.

A core principle in international security studies, particularly within realist and deterrence theory frameworks, is the concept of the rational actor. Rational actor theory suggests that states will make decisions that maximize their strategic interests, particularly under the shadow of mutual assured destruction. Most nuclear-armed states to date, including Israel, have adhered to the tenets of strategic rationality, acting predictably in accordance with national interest and survival. Israel is a democratic, politically stable country and has proven that it is capable of acting as a responsible, rational state actor. 

Even more volatile actors like Pakistan and North Korea, though authoritarian, have demonstrated a clear strategic calculus underpinning their nuclear behaviour. For instance, North Korea has repeatedly communicated that its nuclear arsenal is intended as a defensive deterrent to external regime-change threats, and it has codified its nuclear policy accordingly.

Iran, however, raises unique concerns. Its political system fuses religious ideology with statecraft in a way that challenges the traditional rationality model. The role of the Supreme Leader, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the apocalyptic elements within Iran’s Shi'a revolutionary ideology complicate the risk calculus. While some analysts argue that Iran behaves pragmatically on the international stage, others warn that its theological foundations and proxy warfare across the Middle East suggest a willingness to destabilize the region even at significant cost. 

Opponents of military or political pressure on Iran frequently invoke the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a cautionary tale. They highlight the flawed intelligence surrounding Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which ultimately did not exist. However, this comparison is fundamentally flawed on several counts. Iraq’s regime under Saddam Hussein consistently denied the possession or pursuit of WMDs, creating an atmosphere of opacity and strategic ambiguity. Iran, by contrast, has openly admitted to uranium enrichment activities, which are dual-use by nature and have no clear civilian justification at the current enrichment levels. While Tehran claims its nuclear programme is peaceful, it has repeatedly violated limits set by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reduced IAEA transparency, and expanded its stockpile of enriched uranium well beyond the thresholds agreed in 2015.

The critical distinction, therefore, is transparency and intention. Iraq denied having WMDs—accurately, as it turned out. Iran, however, asserts the right to nuclear development while simultaneously reducing oversight and engaging in activities incompatible with peaceful use, thus fuelling legitimate international suspicion.

Strategic culture—the set of beliefs, practices, and norms shaping a state's approach to national security—is a useful lens through which to interpret the Iran-Israel nuclear asymmetry. Israel, although non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has embedded itself within the Western strategic and deterrence framework. Its defence doctrine rests on survivability in a hostile region, supported by tacit strategic alignments with the U.S. and European states.

Iran, by contrast, sees itself as a revolutionary vanguard in the Muslim world, employing asymmetric warfare, proxy militias, and hybrid strategies. Tehran’s support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis reflects an aggressive external posture. Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, the concern is not only direct use, but the emboldening of its regional proxies under a nuclear umbrella, thereby destabilizing already fragile areas like Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

Additionally, Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could trigger a broader regional arms race, as states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey may pursue their own deterrents. Such proliferation would weaken the global non-proliferation regime and increase the risk of nuclear material falling into non-state actors’ hands.

The distinction between Israel and Iran in nuclear policy is not a product of geopolitical hypocrisy, but rather a function of strategic realism, threat perception, and rational actor evaluation. Israel, while not without controversy, has behaved as a status quo nuclear power with a defensive posture and restrained nuclear rhetoric. Iran, conversely, combines opaque nuclear ambitions with destabilizing regional activity and ideological rhetoric that challenges the foundations of nuclear deterrence theory.

The international community must continue to scrutinise nuclear proliferation through the lenses of strategic intent, governance rationality, and regional impact. Applying a one-size-fits-all standard to states with vastly different political structures and security cultures may seem equitable in theory, but in practice, it ignores the very real risks posed by theocratic or ideologically expansionist regimes, such as Iran, acquiring nuclear capability.